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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, considerable focus was placed on the 
intelligence failures that preceded the attacks. An intelligence community that had been 
designed and conditioned to respond to Cold War threats was suddenly required to adapt to a 
new enemy with new tactics. The aftermath of the attacks underscored the need for human 
intelligence to understand this new enemy and the threats it posed. When the United States 
began taking prisoners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations, these prisoners were often taken 
for their perceived intelligence value.
2
 
As the Bush White House began to develop the legal and policy rationales for treatment of 
these prisoners, the role of physicians and other medical personnel became central to the 
administration’s policy. As the mistreatment of prisoners has gradually come to light, primarily 
due to the release of photos from Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison and reports from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, many critics of the Bush administration policies have questioned 
whether physicians and other medical personnel violated medical ethics. Critics have argued that 
the documents released to date point to medical ethics violations including permitting and 
 
 
 
1 
E-mail from The Honorable Craig Murray, British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, (July 2004), in Steven H. 
Miles, Oath Betrayed: America’s Torture Doctors (University of California Press 2009), “We receive 
intelligence obtained from Uzbek intelligence via the U.S. . . . Tortured dupes are forced to sign up to 
confessions showing what the Uzbek government wants the U.S. and U.K. to believe . . . We are selling 
our souls for dross.” 
2 
In the case of Abu Ghraib, some Army personnel estimated that less than 10% of detainees had any real 
intelligence value.  Miles, at 49. 
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assisting in coercing interrogations, using medical skills and confidential information for non- 
therapeutic purposes, misrepresenting and delaying communication of causes of death, and 
failing to advocate for minimally adequate sanitation, mental health care, shelter from weapon 
fire, and medical care.
3
 
Among these medical personnel, the role of psychologists was unique. Psychologists had 
 
an integral role in the design and application of the so-called “enhanced interrogation 
 
techniques” 4 that became central to military and CIA’s interrogation of detainees.5 Psychologists 
not only helped design the techniques used, they were often in or close to the interrogation room, 
advising interrogators on the methods to be used and how to adjust them.
6  
Psychologists 
developed profiles of detainees in order to determine how best to “break them down” and 
psychologists were there when many of these detainees began to experience serious deterioration 
in their mental health, with many detainees attempting or committing suicide.
7
 
As details of the role of psychologists in these interrogations has come out, there has been 
considerable dissension within the American Psychological Association, with some members 
alleging the association has been complicit with torture and has not spoken out loudly against 
 
 
3 
Miles, at 153. 
4 
The term “enhanced interrogation techniques” which became commonplace in the media coverage of the 
Bush administration’s treatment of detainees appears to have originated with the CIA.  See Office of 
Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities 
(September 2001 – October 2003), (May 7, 2004) available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torture_archive/20040507.pdf  (last visited May 7, 2012).  The writer 
Andrew Sullivan points out the phrase’s similarity to the German Gestapo’s program, “verschärfte 
Vernehmung”, which means enhanced, sharpened, or intensified interrogation, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2007/05/-versch-auml-rfte-vernehmung/228158/ (last 
visited May 7, 2012). 
5 
See Katherine Eban, Rorschach and Awe, Vanity Fair (July 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/07/torture200707  (last visited May 7, 2012); Jane 
Mayer, The Experiment, The New Yorker (July 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/11/050711fa_fact4  (last visited May 7, 2012), and Sheri 
Fink, The Reluctant Enablers of Torture, Salon.com (May 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.salon.com/2009/05/05/torture_20/singleton/ (last visited May 7, 2012). 
6 
Id. 
7 
Id. and Miles, 103-07. 
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torture.
8  
Many of these members argue that psychologists cannot act ethically within the 
national security interrogation framework.
9
 
This paper will argue that the APA should adopt guidelines prohibiting psychologists 
from having non-therapeutic roles in detention facilities and stating that psychologists outside 
those facilities should not provide any guidance to interrogators on any techniques that may be 
deemed physically or psychologically coercive.  Part I discusses the legal justification for the use 
of “enhanced interrogation techniques” in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the contemplated 
role of medical and psychological personnel. Part II will examine the state of medical and 
psychological ethics codes that were in place in the post-World War II pre-9/11 era. Part III will 
then detail the ethical failures of medical and psychological personnel involved in 
post-9/11 interrogations and torture. Part IV will then discuss the reaction of medical societies to 
the revelation of detainee abuse and the involvement of medical personnel. Particular attention 
will be paid to the response of the APA and the ongoing debate within that organization. Part V 
will then discuss the ethical challenges posed by the involvement of medical and psychological 
personnel in interrogations, and Part VI will discuss the major bioethical principles that should 
inform the work of all psychologists, whether clinical or academic. 
 
 
 
I.  BUSH ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION 
TECHNIQUES” 
The United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan in October of 2001 and shortly 
 
thereafter began taking prisoners there.
10  
The first prisoners to be housed in Guantanamo Bay 
 
 
 
 
8 
See, e.g., Jeffrey Kaye, Why Torture Made Me Leave the APA, (March 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.alternet.org/rights/78909  (last accessed May 7, 2012). 
9 
Id. 
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arrived in January of 2002.
11  
The reasons for involvement of medical personnel and particularly 
psychologists began with the White House’s legal justification for the standards of treatment of 
these detainees. The administration laid the basis for enhanced interrogation techniques by first 
arguing in a series of memos that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the U.S. War Crimes Act did 
not apply to Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
12  
Despite opposition from Secretary of State Colin Powell 
and State Department Counsel Howard Taft IV, this argument prevailed and became official U.S. 
policy.
13  
A memo from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently advised Defense 
Department personnel that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban, but 
that detainees were to be treated humanely in a manner consistent with the principles of the 
Convention “to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity.”14 
President Bush affirmed this order on February 7, 2002 in his own order accepting the 
 
conclusions of the Justice Department that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda 
and that the Taliban were unlawful combatants and therefore did not qualify as prisoners of war 
under Article 4 of the Convention.
15
 
Having found the Geneva Convention inapplicable to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the Bush 
 
administration next addressed the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
 
 
 
10 
Office of the Surgeon General of the Army, Final Report, Assessment of Detainee Medical Operations 
for OEF, GTMO, and OIF (Apr. 13, 2005), pg. 2-1, available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/85008/02920_050413.pdf  (last accessed May 7, 2012). 
11 
Id. 
12 
See Memorandum from John Yoo and Robert Delahunty to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, 
Department of Defense, re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 
2002) and Memorandum from Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President, re: Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 
22, 2002) reprinted in Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to 
Abu Ghraib, (Cambridge University Press 2005), at 38 and 81. 
13 
Miles, at 145-46. 
14 
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, re: Status of Taliban 
and Al Qaida (Jan. 19, 2002), in Greenberg & Dratel, 80. 
15 
Memorandum from George W. Bush to The Vice President et al., re: Humane Treatment of Taliban and 
al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) in Greenberg & Dratel, 134. 
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and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “Convention Against Torture”). The Convention 
Against Torture is codified in the United States Code under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.  The 
Justice Department offered the following interpretation of what constitutes torture under § 2340 
in a memo from Office of Legal Counsel Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to the 
President’s Counsel, Alberto Gonzales: 
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function, or even death.  For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture 
under Section 2340, it must result in significant psychological harm of significant 
duration, e.g. lasting for months or even years. 
16
 
 
The memo further argued that the statute’s specific intent requirement means that for a defendant 
to have the requisite intent, “the infliction of such pain must be the defendant’s precise 
objective.”17  Addressing the Convention Against Torture, the memo noted that the Convention 
only provides penalties for this extreme conduct, many actions that would constitute “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” do not rise to the level of torture and parties to 
the treaty need not criminalize them.
18
 
 
 
 
16 
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340- 
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in Greenberg & Dratel, 172.  The memo went on define the degree of mental harm 
necessary to constitute torture: “We conclude that mental harm also must result from one of the predicate 
acts listed in the statute, namely: threats of imminent death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that 
would amount to physical torture; infliction of such physical pain as a means of psychological torture; use 
of drugs or other procedures designed to deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally alter an individual’s 
personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party.” 
17 
Id. 
18 
Id.  The memo notes that even if some conduct arguably violated § 2340A, the statute may 
unconstitutionally encroach on the President’s Commander-in-Chief power.  Further, the memo argues, 
the defenses of necessity and self-defense may be available in the event of prosecution.  Former Office of 
Legal Counsel Attorney Jack Goldsmith described the effect of this memo: “[V]iolent acts aren’t 
necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a defense; and even if you don’t have a defense, 
the torture law doesn’t apply if you act under the color of presidential authority.  CIA interrogators and 
their supervisors, under pressure to get information about the next attack, viewed the opinion as a ‘golden 
shield’, as one CIA official later called it, that provided enormous comfort.” in Jack Goldsmith, The Terror 
Presidency, (W.W. Norton & Co. 2007), at 144. 
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Prior to 2002, the Department of Defense had long relied on Army Field Manual 34-52 as 
the standard source for interrogation doctrine.
19  
In October of 2002, the commander of the 
Guantanamo interrogation teams wrote a memo seeking approval for what would become known 
as “enhanced interrogation techniques.”20  In a memo supporting the approval of the new 
interrogation methods, Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, an attorney with Joint Task Force 170 
(the unit in charge of the Guantanamo Bay prison), argued that some of the methods would be 
permissible if done “with appropriate medical monitoring.”21 went on to recommend that certain 
more aggressive techniques “undergo a legal, medical, behavioral science, and intelligence 
review prior to their commencement.”22  Secretary Rumsfeld approved the use of these additional 
techniques and proceeded to appoint a working group to develop interrogation policy.
23
 
Based on the working group’s reports Secretary Rumsfeld issued a memo to the 
Commander of U.S. Southern Command, whose jurisdiction includes Guantanamo Bay, 
outlining the interrogation techniques approved for use and how they should be employed.
24  
As 
noted by Steven Miles in his book Oath Betrayed, the memo “sketch[es] a philosophy of medical 
partnership with coercive interrogation.
25  
The memo notes that “interrogations must always be 
planned, deliberate actions that take into account . . . a detainee’s emotional and physical 
 
 
19 
Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, (August 2004), at 7 
available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70989/02578_040824_001display.pdf (last 
accessed May 7, 2012). 
20 
Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer to Commander, Joint Task Force 170, re: Request 
for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002) in Greenberg & Dratel, pg. 227. 
21 
Memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver to Commander, Joint Task Force 170, re: Legal 
Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2001) in Greenberg & Dratel, pg. 229. 
22 
Id. 
23 
Miles, at 149. 
24 
Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, 
re: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2003) in Greenberg & Dratel, pg. 
360. 
25 
Miles, at 149. 
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strengths and weaknesses. Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the detainee’s 
emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation.”26  The Secretary’s memo also 
proposes roles for medical personnel in interrogations, including medical and psychological 
review of the use of the isolation technique, medical clearance of the detainee for interrogation, 
and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel as safeguards.
27  Rumsfeld’s 
approval and the OLC legal justifications for these techniques came despite the fact that any of 
the enhanced interrogation techniques alone had been considered torture by the U.N. Committee 
on Torture and/or the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture.
28  
Those approvals also came despite 
the fact that the U.S. had considered these practices as torture in other countries.
29
 
 
 
 
 
III.  MEDICAL ETHICS AND TREATMENT OF DETAINEES POST WORLD WAR II 
The atrocities of the Nazis during World War II, including many acts perpetrated by 
doctors, spurred the international community to reiterate its opposition to torture. Both 
American and world medical societies were unequivocal in stating that torture was wrong and 
that doctors should not participate or facilitate it in any fashion.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
Rumsfeld memo, note 23 supra. 
27 
Id.   Similarly, the CIA’s Office of Medical Services described its mandate in the interrogation arena as 
“assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency detainees subject to ‘enhanced’ interrogation 
techniques, and for determining that the authorized administration of these techniques would not be 
expected to cause serious or permanent harm.” Office of Medical Services, Central Intelligence Agency, 
OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation, and 
Detention, (May 17, 2004) available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/72435/02793_041200display.pdf  (last accessed May 7, 2012). 
28 
Vincent Iacopino and Stephen Xenakis, Neglect of Medical Evidence of Torture in Guantanamo Bay: A 
Case Series, PLoS Medicine, Volume 8, Issue 4, (April 2011) available at 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001027 (last accessed 
May 7, 2012. 
29 
Id. 
30 
Miles, at 37 noting that while torture has been universally condemned by various medical societies, 
“Professional sanctions against medical personnel are rare enough to be noteworthy.” 
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A.  RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND SOCIETIES 
 
The newly formed United Nations embraced the Enlightenment idea that torture had no 
place in civilized society and that investigative necessity, war, national sovereignty, or revenge 
could not justify its use.
31  
One of the United Nations’ first acts was the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). The UDHR reaffirms the rights and dignity of all 
humans and prohibits torture in its Article 5, stating, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
The Third Geneva Convention made a similar statement in its Article 3, declaring: 
“(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their and arms and placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely . . . To This end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned 
persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; . . . (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; . . . (2) The wounded and sick 
shall be collected and cared for.” 
 
 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reiterated the international community’s 
stated intolerance for torture and degrading treatment in 1966 and by the Helsinki Accords in 
1975. 
 
The  Nuremberg  Trials  also  incited  the  international community to  focus  on  doctor 
participation in torture and the need for ethical standards for physicians in charge of prisoners.
32
 
Twenty-three doctors were indicted, tried and mostly convicted for their involvement in the 
atrocities of the Nazi regime.
33    
The World Medical Association adopted its “Regulations in 
Time of Armed Conflict” in 1956.  These regulations, while not explicitly referencing torture, 
stated “[t]he primary task of the medical profession is to preserve health and save life.  Hence it 
 
31 
Miles, at 31. 
32 
Miles, at 33. 
33 
Id. 
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is deemed unethical for physicians to (a) [g]ive advice or perform prophylactic, diagnostic, or 
therapeutic procedures that are not justifiable in the patient’s interest [or to] (b) [w]eaken the 
physical or mental strength of a human being without therapeutic justification.”34 
The World Medical Association later strengthened their language and explicitly rejected 
 
the association of medical professionals with torture. Its Declaration of Tokyo provides, in part: 
 
1. The physician shall not countenance, condone or participate in the practice of 
torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading procedures, whatever the 
offense of which the victim of such procedures is suspected, accused or guilty, 
and whatever the victim's beliefs or motives, and in all situations, including armed 
conflict and civil strife.   2. The physician shall not provide any premises, 
instruments, substances or knowledge to facilitate the practice of torture or other 
forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . .  3. . . . The physician shall not 
use nor allow to be used, as far as he or she can, medical knowledge or skills, or 
health information specific to individuals, to facilitate or otherwise aid any 
interrogation, legal or illegal, of those individuals.   The physician shall not be 
present during any procedure during which torture or any other forms of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment is used or threatened.
35
 
 
This declaration proved hugely influential as the U.N. and various world medical societies made 
their own statements condemning medical complicity with torture.
36  
The World Psychiatric 
Association, in its Declaration of Madrid addressed torture, stating, “Psychiatrists shall not take 
part in any process of mental or physical torture, even when authorities attempt to force their 
involvement in such acts.”37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
World Medical Association, Regulations in Times of Armed Conflict (1956). 
35 
WMA Declaration of Tokyo - Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment, adopted October 
1975 and editorially revised in 2005 and 2006.  The declaration also stresses the need for a physician’s 
clinical independence and proclaims that a prisoner should not be fed by artificial means where such 
prisoner has made an unimpaired and rational refusal of nourishment. 
36 
Miles, at 35. 
37 
Madrid Declaration on Ethical Standards for Psychiatric Practice (1996). 
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B. RESPONSE OF AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETIES 
 
American medical societies, including the American College of Physicians and the 
American Medical Association (the “AMA”), followed with their own statements forbidding 
physician involvement in torture.
38  
The AMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued 
an opinion in 1999, declaring, in part: 
“Torture refers to the deliberate, systematic, or wanton administration of cruel, 
inhumane, and degrading treatments or punishments during imprisonment or 
detainment.  Physicians must oppose and must not participate in torture for any 
reason. Participation in torture includes, but is not limited to, providing or 
withholding any services, substances, or knowledge to facilitate the practice of 
torture. Physicians must not be present when torture is used or threatened. 
Physicians may treat prisoners or detainees if doing so is in their best interest, but 
physicians should not treat individuals to verify their health so that torture can 
begin or continue. . . . Physicians should help provide support for victims of 
torture and, whenever possible, strive to change situations in which torture is 
practiced or the potential for torture is great.”39 
 
 
 
The psychiatric and psychological communities were similarly opposed to torture; 
especially as research in the latter half of the century revealed the myriad psychiatric harms 
brought about by torture.
40     
The American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association issued a joint position statement in 1985 condemning torture and 
supporting both  the  U.N.  Convention Against  Torture and  the  U.N.  Principles of  Medical 
Ethics.
41
 
Unfortunately the APA ethics code was not entirely clear on what psychologist’s ethical 
 
duties were in the national security setting. The APA’s code is titled “Ethical Principles of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
Miles, at 36. 
39 
American Medical Association Opinion 2.067 – Torture (issued December 1999.) 
40 
Miles, at 36-37. 
41 
Against Torture: Joint Resolution of the American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association (1985). 
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Psychologists and Code of Conduct,” hereinafter the “Code.”42    The Code consists of two 
sections, “General Principles” and “Ethical Standards.”  The General Principles contain five 
aspirational goals, namely “Beneficence and Nonmaleficence,” “Fidelity and Responsibility,” 
“Integrity,” “Justice,” and “Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity.”43   The General Principles, 
in contrast to the Ethical Standards, “do not represent obligations and should not form the basis 
for imposing sanctions.”44 
In August of 2002, the APA revised the Code for the first time in ten years. Most notably, 
the APA Ethics Committee modified Ethical Standard 1.02, “Relationship of Ethics and Law.”  
The 1992 version of 1.02 stated that when psychologists’ ethical obligations conflict with the law, 
“psychologists make known their commitment to the Ethics Code and take steps to resolve the 
conflict in a responsible manner.”45 The 2002 amendments kept this language, but 
added that “[i]f the conflict is unresolvable via such means, psychologists may adhere to the 
requirements of the law, regulations, or other governing legal authority.”46  Critics of the APA 
have argued that this language essentially adopts the Nuremberg defense, a defense that had been 
universally refused decades before.
47  
While the APA’s opposition to torture was clear, its 
 
 
 
 
42 
APA Ethical Principles and Code of Conduct, (2010 Amendments) available at 
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx (last accessed May 7, 2012). 
43 
Id. 
44 
Id. 
45 
APA Ethical Principles and Code of conduct, (1992 Amendments) available at 
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/code-1992.aspx (last accessed May 7, 2012). 
46 
See Redline Comparison of APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, December 
1992 and December 2002 available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/92-02codecompare.pdf (last 
accessed May 7, 2012). 
47 
Kenneth Pope and Thomas Gutheil, Psychologists Abandon the Nuremberg Ethic: Concerns for 
Detainee Interrogations, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Vol. 32, No. 3, at 161-166, (May- 
June 2009). For its part, the APA has insisted that the change in the Code had nothing to do with the war 
on terror and was drafted largely in response to conflicts that arise when court issue subpoenas for 
psychologists’ records.  See letter from Melba Vazquez, APA President to Psychologists for an Ethical 
APA, (December 5, 2011) available at http://www.apa.org/news/press/statements/ethical-psychologist.pdf 
(last accessed May 7, 2012). 
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guidance for its members in situations where torture or degrading treatment might occur was 
lacking. 
 
 
 
III. PSYCHOLOGISTS’ PARTICIPATION IN INTERROGATION AND TORTURE 
Despite the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, the U.N. Principles of 
Medical Ethics and ethics codes of medical societies around the world, detainees in Guantanamo 
Bay, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and dozens of other U.S. prisons both known and unknown were 
subject to torture, cruel and inhumane treatment and degradation.
48 
The 2004 International Red 
Cross report on Iraqi detainees found that those under supervision of military intelligence were 
“subjected to a variety of harsh treatments ranging from insults, threats and humiliations to both 
physical and psychological coercion which in some cases was tantamount to torture in order to 
force cooperation with their interrogators.”49   Certain “high value” detainees in CIA custody 
reported being subjected to continuous solitary confinement, waterboarding, prolonged stress 
standing, beatings by use of a collar, beating and kicking, confinement in a box, prolonged 
nudity, sleep deprivation and use of loud music, exposure to cold temperature or cold water, 
prolonged use of handcuffs and shackles, threats, forced shaving, and deprivation or restricted 
provision of solid food.
50     
In many cases, doctors were there either facilitating, ignoring or 
 
 
48 
See International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value 
Detainees” in CIA Custody, (February, 2007), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/71001/03083_070214_001display.pdf (last accessed May 7, 
2012), Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by Coalition 
Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During 
Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, (February 2004), available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/84931/01338_040200.pdf  (last accessed May 7, 2012). 
49 
Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by Coalition Forces 
of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, 
Internment and Interrogation, at 3-4. 
50 
ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen “High Value Detainees” in CIA Custody, at 7-9.  The 
reported methods of ill-treatment largely correspond to methods found in the Office of Medical Services, 
Central Intelligence Agency, OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee 
Jim Cosgrove 
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covering up these abuses.
51    
Medical personnel cleared detainees for interrogation and used 
confidential information to help formulate interrogation plans.
52    
Medical personnel ignored 
squalid  sanitation  and  proper  standards  of  care  for  tuberculosis  management.
53      
Medical 
personnel failed to document signs of abuse on medical records and concealed causes of death on 
death certificates.
54   
Medical personnel allowed prisoners to be kept in areas that were subject to 
attack by enemy fire.
55  
There is also evidence that medical care was withheld from detainees 
during questioning
56 
and some evidence to suggest that detainees were given mind-altering drugs 
to gain information during interrogations.
57
 
 
 
 
Rendition, Interrogation, and Detention, (May 17, 2004) available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/72435/02793_041200display.pdf  (last accessed May 7, 2012), 
and methods that had been legally cleared by the Office of Legal Counsel.  See Memorandum from 
Steven Bradbury to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, re: Application 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High 
Value al Qaeda Detainee, (May 10, 2005) available at 
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70996/02929_050510display.pdf  (last accessed May 7, 2012), 
and Memorandum from Steven Bradbury to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Counsel, Central Intelligence 
Agency, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture 
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees, (May 30, 
2005) available at http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70997/02941_050530display.pdf  (last 
accessed May 7, 2012). 
51 
Miles, at 119-33 and Iacopino, at 4. 
52 
Id., at 52-53 and Peter Slevin and Joe Stephens, Detainees' medical files shared: Guantanamo 
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While these acts and omissions of doctors, nurses, and medics are reprehensible and 
deserving of further discussion, the role of psychologists in post 9/11 interrogation and torture 
has been unique and presents numerous ethical issues.  Psychologists were the primary architects 
and implementers of the new enhanced interrogation techniques.
58 
Psychologists were often 
responsible for developing a profile of a detainee and then customizing an interrogation plan 
based on that profile.
59 
Psychologists were in or near the interrogation room and were available 
to interrogators to suggest tweaks in interrogation plans.
60   
And psychologists were there when 
 
many of these detainees began to experience steep declines in mental health.
61
 
Many of the techniques used on detainees were based on the military’s Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape (“SERE”) program.62    The SERE program was designed to train U.S. 
soldiers to endure and resist torture techniques used by the Chinese and North Korean 
governments.
63      
The  program  was  created  after  American  servicemen  captured  during  the 
Korean War made false confessions after being tortured.
64    
Multiple reports have named two 
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SERE  psychologists,  James  Mitchell  and  Bruce  Jessen,  as  reverse-engineering  the  SERE 
program to use on detainees and training interrogators on these techniques, which included sleep- 
deprivation,  exposure  to  extreme  temperatures, and  waterboarding.
65      
Despite  having  little 
science behind their methods and no experience with interrogations, Mitchell and Jessen’s 
techniques were embraced by the Department of Defense and the CIA.
66    
The techniques they 
suggested are the same ones that appear in the Office of Legal Counsel and the Rumsfeld 
memoranda. 
The role of psychologists did not end with the design of the enhanced interrogation 
program.  The techniques advocated by Mitchell and Jessen were instilled in and deployed by 
groups of psychologists, physicians and psychiatrists known as Behavioral Science Consultation 
Teams (“BSCT”), or “biscuits.”67 BSCT members reviewed detainee medical information with 
an eye towards interrogation, “performed psychological assessments, recommended physically 
and psychologically coercive interrogation plans, monitored and provided feedback during 
interrogations, and taught behavioral techniques to interrogators.”68    In addition to monitoring 
and recommending the use of sleep deprivation and manipulation, stress positions, exposure to 
loud noise and temperature extremes, BSCT members crafted interrogation plans that exploited 
detainee phobias of darkness, confined spaces, and insects, as well as cultural sensitivities around 
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sexuality and the Koran.
69   
An Army Surgeon General report described the role of the BSCTs: 
“[BSCTS are to] check the medical history of detainees . . . and what are their buttons.  [BSCTs] 
will greatly assist [the interrogators] with: obtaining more accurate intelligence information, 
knowing how to gain better rapport with the detainees and also knowing when to push or not to 
push harder in pursuit of intelligence information.”70 
Neglect of mental health was a major problem in prisons at Guantanamo Bay, in Iraq, and 
 
in Afghanistan.
71  
The Red Cross observed detainees with numerous stress-induced impairments, 
as well as anxiety and thoughts of suicide.
72   
Numerous suicide attempts have been documented 
at Guantanamo Bay.
73    
A 2003 Army report of conditions in Iraqi prisons observed that, “The 
mentally ill were receiving no treatment . . . Mental illness is a grossly neglected area for the 
health care of Iraqi detainees.”74   In addition, prisons frequently did not have medicines to treat 
major  psychiatric conditions.
75      
Mentally  ill  prisoners  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan were  often 
confined in the same cellblocks as general population prisoners and subject to heightened abuse 
from guards and military police.
76
 
The ethical failures of the psychological community were not confined to the various war 
 
theatres. As noted by psychologist Jeff Kaye, the APA went so far as to conduct a conference on 
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“deception scenarios” with the CIA and the RAND Corporation.77   Among the questions to be 
discussed were “[w]hat pharmacological agents are known to affect apparent truth-telling 
behavior?”, “[w]hat are sensory overloads on the maintenance of deceptive behaviors?”, and 
“[h]ow might we overload the system or overwhelm the senses and see how it affects deceptive 
behaviors?”.78 
 
 
 
IV. RESPONSE OF MEDICAL SOCIETIES TO ALLEGATIONS OF PHYSICIAN 
COMPLICITY IN TORTURE 
American medical organizations were quick to condemn the involvement of physicians in 
torture.    In  June  2006,  the  American  Medical  Association  adopted  an  opinion  detailing 
guidelines for physician participation in interrogations.
79   
That opinion states that “[t]he further 
removed the physician is from direct involvement with the detainee, the more justifiable is a role 
serving the public interest.”80    While the opinion allows physicians to develop interrogation 
strategies for “general training purposes,” those strategies must be humane and respect the rights 
of individuals.
81  
Coercive techniques, i.e. techniques that threaten or cause physical injury or 
mental suffering are prohibited.
82    
Furthermore, physicians are prohibited from conducting or 
participating in interrogations, as well as monitoring interrogations with the intention to 
intervene.
83   
The opinion also places an affirmative obligation on physicians to report violations 
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to the appropriate authorities when they believe interrogations are coercive.
84    
The American 
Psychiatric Association took a similar position in 2006, prohibiting direct psychiatrist 
involvement in interrogations and requiring psychiatrists to report torture.
85    
The American 
Psychiatric Association’s position statement says, in part: 
“No psychiatrist should participate directly in the interrogation of persons held in 
custody by military or civilian investigative or law enforcement authorities, 
whether in the United States or elsewhere. Direct participation includes being 
present in the interrogation room, asking or suggesting questions, or advising 
authorities on the use of specific techniques of interrogation with particular 
detainees. However, psychiatrists may provide training to military or civilian 
investigative or law enforcement personnel on recognizing and responding to 
persons with mental illnesses, on the possible medical and psychological effects 
of particular techniques and conditions of interrogation, and on other areas within 
their professional expertise.” 
 
Both the AMA and American Psychiatric Association make clear that their professionals have no 
non-therapeutic role in the interrogation room or behind the glass. 
In contrast to the AMA and American Psychiatric Association’s position, the American 
Psychological Association has continued to see a role for psychologists in interrogations—much 
to the dismay of many critics and APA members. One of the APA’s first responses to reports of 
psychologist involvement in interrogation and torture was the establishment of a Presidential 
Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS). The PENS Task Force was 
charged with examining “whether our current Ethics Code adequately addresses [the ethical 
dimensions of psychologists’ involvement in national security-related activities], whether the 
APA provides adequate ethical guidance to psychologists involved in these endeavors, and 
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whether APA should develop policy to address the role of psychologists and psychology in 
investigations related to national security.”86  The report described psychologists as having “a 
valuable and ethical role to assist in protecting our nation, other nations, and innocent civilians 
from harm, which will at times entail gathering information that can be used in our nation’s and 
other nations’ defense.”87 The report seemed to echo military justifications for the involvement 
of psychologists, stating, "While engaging in such consultative and advisory roles entails a 
delicate balance of ethical considerations, doing so puts psychologists in a unique position to 
assist in ensuring that such processes are safe and ethical for all participants."
88
 
The PENS Report came under immediate attack for maintaining that psychologists could 
ethically participate in interrogations. Critics pointed to the composition of the PENS Task Force 
whose ten members included six psychologists employed by the Department of Defense, four of 
whom had consulted on interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
89   
They also 
pointed to long-standing collaboration and financial ties between the APA and the Pentagon.
90
 
In response, the APA has consistently maintained that it is opposed to torture and reiterated its 
mantra that psychologists can make interrogations “safe and ethical.”  In fact, in 2006, the 
President of the APA, Dr. Gerald Koocher, claimed that psychologists were best placed to detect 
and prevent “behavioral drift” on the part of interrogators, i.e. the drift into abusive and illegal 
behavior.
91    
But psychologists are just as susceptible to “behavioral drift” as members of any 
other profession and are subject to the same psychosocial forces.
92
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V.  THE ETHICAL DILEMMAS PRESENTED BY PSYCHOLOGIST INVOLVEMENT IN 
INTERROGATION 
As the experiences in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan make clear, there are 
significant problems with psychologists’ participation in interrogation. As an initial matter, it is 
exceedingly difficult to define just what torture is. In a recent article, Mary-Hunter Morris 
McDonnell, Loran Nordgren, and George Lowenstein argue that two separate psychological 
biases prevent valid evaluations of the severity of interrogation tactics.
93  
The first bias, the self- 
serving bias, “motivates evaluators to interpret facts or rules in a way that suits their interests – 
leads administrators to promote more narrow interpretations of torture when faced with a 
perceived threat to their nations’ security.”94  Thus, the bar for torture is raised at those times 
when it is most likely to be used.
95  
The other bias is what’s called the “hot-to-cold empathy 
gap,” which captures the idea shown in numerous studies that people who are not experiencing a 
visceral hot state, such as fear, hunger or pain, routinely underestimate its intensity.
96 
The 
authors performed experiments that found that individuals who experienced states that can be 
induced by enhanced interrogation techniques – for example, fatigue, coldness, or social isolation 
– tended to evaluate that technique as significantly more painful and unethical than participants 
who were not experiencing the state.
97  
The authors conclude that individuals perceive the line 
between torture and enhanced interrogation “shifts with the visceral experience 
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of the evaluator.”98  These findings suggest that the administrators and judges considering 
enhanced interrogation techniques are “at risk of systematically underestimating the severity of 
the tactics,” as they are unlikely to be experiencing a visceral hot state when making their 
evaluations.
99
 
A further challenge posed by psychologist participation in interrogations is the issue of 
conflicting professional identities. Research in identity theory has found that individuals have 
multiple identities that exist in a hierarchy of “salience,” or the likelihood of a particular identity 
being activated.
100  
The salience of any particular identity is influenced by individuals’ 
relationships with other people.
101  
The degree to which a person’s relationships require that 
person to have a particular identity or role is termed “commitment” in identity theory.102  The 
higher the degree of commitment, the higher the salience of a particular identity will be.
103
 
 
Salience and commitment work to reinforce each other through self-verification.
104  
Self- 
verification is the process by which individuals compare their own sense of self with the 
feedback they receive from others.
105  
Where the two conflict, individuals will often try to 
reconcile the two whether consciously or unconsciously.
106
 
In situations where an individual has multiple identities activated, “identity theory 
predicts that ‘the identity with the higher level of prominence or the identity with the higher level 
of commitment will guide behavior more than an identity with a lower level of prominence or 
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commitment.”107  A large study of in-house counsel found that the salience of the attorney’s dual 
identities influenced their treatment of professional ethics and that these decisions were largely 
unconscious.
108  
The study suggested that “at least in some cases, the problem is not merely one 
of moral courage—instead, it appears that at least in certain conditions, professionals may truly 
fail to recognize the ‘professionally correct’ course of action.”109 
This problem of dual identity or dual loyalty is especially pronounced in the military 
setting. The military culture is strong and will tend to dominate whatever other professional 
identities one may have. The love of country and the interests of national security are seen as 
overarching goods.  The problem of dual loyalty for doctors in the military is hardly new: 
“An extreme case in recent history occurred in Nazi death camps, where doctors 
supervised killings and selected which people went into the camps and which 
were killed.  Physicians who interviewed Nazi doctors said most were normal 
people who went home on weekends to be fathers and husbands.  They weren’t 
killers before serving in the death camps and didn’t continue killing afterward. 
Those who interviewed U.S. soldiers about atrocities in Vietnam said there’s an 
internalization of the ethos of the organization that then prompts actions the 
person wouldn’t ordinarily perform.”110 
 
The psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton has called this phenomenon “doubling.”111  Individuals 
can be socialized to evil in one environment and act within those rules and behave 
differently when outside that environment.
112
 
The Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations that had been tasked 
by  Secretary  Rumsfeld  to  investigate  and  make  recommendations  on  treatment  of 
detainees in the wake of the release of the Abu Ghraib photos found much in the social 
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psychology literature that would suggest that there was a heightened chance of abuse in 
these situations.
113   
Factors leading to abuse include groupthink, dehumanization of the 
enemy, and moral exclusion, “the process whereby one group views another as 
fundamentally different, and therefore prevailing moral rules and practices apply to one 
group but not the other.”114   The report further noted that a number of factors could lead 
to moral disengagement, including moral justification, euphemistic language, 
advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, and 
attribution of blame.
115
 
The  Independent  Panel  pointed  to  a  number  of  environmental  factors  that 
similarly exacerbated the potential for abuse.  Those factors included “poor training, 
[constant threat of attack], insufficient staffing, inadequate oversight, confused lines of 
authority, evolving and unclear policy, and a generally poor quality of life.”116     The 
report further pointed out that the widespread practice of stripping detainees might have 
been a significant factor in detainee abuse, noting, “[t]he wearing of clothing is an 
inherently social practice, and therefore stripping away of clothing may have had the 
unintended consequence of dehumanizing detainees in the eyes of those who interacted 
with them.”117 
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VI.  ENHANCED INTERROGATION, TORTURE AND BIOETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
Bioethical principles call into question the actions of many psychologists in the post-9/11 
era. The bioethical principle of “respect for persons” acknowledges two ethical beliefs, that 
individuals have a right to autonomy and that those with diminished autonomy deserve 
protection.
118  
Psychologists and other medical personnel are morally required to protect those 
with diminished autonomy, such as detainees. The widespread abuses across Guantanamo Bay, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan were clear violations of this basic tenet of bioethics. This concept is 
embodied in the Geneva Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and medical 
ethics codes around the world. Respect for persons was also violated by the routine violation of 
doctor patient confidentiality.
119
 
The principle of beneficence was also routinely violated. The principle of beneficence 
has been stated as two complementary rules: “1. do not harm and 2. maximize possible benefits 
and minimize possible harms.”120  Psychologists routinely played an active role in the harm of 
detainees and, far too often, failed to speak up on the detainee’s behalf. Detainees were subject 
to torture, squalid conditions, lack of medicine, and exposure to weapons fire, among other 
abuses. Psychologists and other medical personnel put the interests of the military and national 
security ahead of the detainees they were supposed to not harm and to protect from harm. 
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Psychologists and other medical personnel also did not abide by the principle of justice. 
Justice recognizes the principle that each person should be treated fairly and equitably.
121  
The 
involvement of medical personnel in torture, abuse and degradation of detainees is clearly an 
injustice. Psychologists and other personnel caved to institutional pressure to keep detainees, 
guilty and innocent, healthy and ill in conditions of indefinite detention, abuse, and degradation. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The inherent difficulty in defining torture and the overwhelming institutional pressure that 
the military can exert supports the idea that psychologists should not play any role in the design 
or implementation of coercive interrogations. The APA’s current position allows too much 
leeway for psychologists to be in situations where their ethics may be compromised and prisoners 
may be harmed. Contrary to the APA’s repeated assertions, psychologists are not any more 
capable than other individuals to keep interrogations safe and ethical. They are not any more 
capable than any other professional of determining what constitutes torture when they are place 
in prisons around the world as part of the ongoing “war on terror.” The abuses at Guantanamo, 
Abu Ghraib, Bagram and various prisons around the world were the result of a decision by the 
Bush administration to toss aside the rule of law and redefine torture. It was the cynical 
argument that torture cannot have occurred if a doctor or psychologist was present. To expect 
psychologists to stand up to such massive institutional, social, and psychological pressure is a 
woefully ill-conceived idea. The history of the 20th and 21st centuries is replete with examples 
of physicians becoming complicit with torture and cruel and inhumane treatment. Nothing other 
than a bright line prohibition from any involvement in interrogation will protect medical 
professionals from the threat of becoming complicit with torture. The APA should 
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adopt such a bright line rule for the benefit of U.S. detainees worldwide and its membership. If 
psychologists are in prisons, they should be there in therapeutic roles. 
Furthermore, the major principles of bioethics, instilled in the APA’s own Ethics Code 
demand that those psychologists who advise the United States and those who interrogate for the 
United States do not recommend or provide guidance on any techniques that may be deemed 
physically or psychologically coercive. The APA should make clear that it will not tolerate 
psychologists who fail to show a respect for persons, beneficence, and a commitment to justice, 
